THE WIRE-TAPPING CONTROVERSY: A SYMPTOM
OF THE TIMES
A.THOUGH THE WIRE-TAPPING controversy is but one facet of the larger
problem of accommodating the often antithetical demands of individual
liberty and public welfare,1 it affords an insight into the nature and direction of its resolution.' The recent wire-tapping case of United States
v. Sydlivan, then, is not without a certain broad significance.
In that case, the defendant, charged with violation of the Narcotics
Act,4 moved to suppress evidence discovered on his premises pursuant
to a search warrant which allegedly had been illegally issued. In support of this allegation, the defendant relied on the admitted fact that
1 In

support of legalizing strong wire-tap measures it is argued that to counter-

balance the benefits of technology available to law-breakers, law enforcement officers
should be empowered to secure evidence through wire-tapping; that such a privilege
would be used only against the guilty-for detection of espionage, sabotage, treason,
and possibly kidnapping; that it can in no way harm the innocent, and that it does
not violate any civil rights. On the other hand, it is argued that wire-tapping cannot
be limited to use against the guilty onlyi that the possible abuses are serious in that
too much power would be placed in the hands of a few; and that democracy must
sometimes forego efficiency in order to preserve liberty. The Fourth Amendment
itself is a bar to quick and efficient action by law enforcement officers; but self-denial
on the part of the government is an essential characteristic of any free society. See
generally Wire Tapping-The Right of Privacy Versus the Public Interest, 40 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 476 (1949); Brownell, The Public Security and WireTapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1954); Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An
Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COL. L. REV. 165 (1952); Rosenzweig, The
Law of Wire-Tapping, 32 CORNELL L.Q. S14 (1947); Rogers, The Case for WireTapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (954); Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the WireTapping Controversy, 63 YALE L.J. 799 (i954) BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FREE
MEN (i95i); Berger, Tapping the Wires, The New Yorker, June x8, 193 8; The
Hot Wire-Tapping Debate; The Case for, and a Hard-Hitting Argument Against It,
Newsweek, Jan. 11, 1954, p. zo Wire-Tapping: The Pros and Cons, N.Y. Times
Mag., Nov. 29, 1953.
2 The storm that rages about wire-tapping is at most a reflection of general attitudes
towards a system of "ordered liberty." The same elements are present in the debate
that now waxes over communist subversion, academic freedom, "McCarthylsm," and
many others. See, e.g., McCarthyism, Pro and Con, U.S. News and World Report,

Dec. 4, 1953, p. io6; Report on Atcademic Freedom, 13 LAW. GUILD REV. 30
(953) ; Simmons, Democracy and Communism, z7 PHIL. L.J. 831 (195z), Buckley
and Bozell, Book Review, America, May x5, 1954, p. 191; Neff, Retreat front Heresy,
Science Monthly, Jan. 1954, p. i9; Braden, Turmoil in the State Department, U.S.
News and World Report, Apr. 9, 1954, P- 30.
a zx6 F.Supp. 480 (D.D.C. 1954).
' 38 STAT 785 (x4), z6 U.S.C. §§ 2550-2604 (1946).
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the warrant had been issued on the basis of information disclosed in a
monitored telephone conversation in which an informer had made arrangements with defendant for the purchase of narcotics. The court
denied defendant's motion, however, pointing out that since the informer knew of, and consented to, the eavesdropping, it did not constitute wire-tapping within the prohibition of Section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act.5 Interception, the court ruled, includes only those
instances of wire-tapping and recordation both made without the
knowledge and divulged without the consent of either party to the
conversation.
Section 605 appears to be an outgrowth of the decision in United
States v. Olmstead6 where a divided court held that wire-tapping does
not contravene the Fourth Amendment's 'proscription of unlawful search
and seizure. 7 The majority reasoned that one who installs a telephone
with connecting wires impliedly intends to project his voice to those
outside, and that messages, while passing through wires outside his
premises are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.8 It
was the vigorous dissents of Messrs. Holmes and Brandeis,9 however,
r48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946). For a brief discussion of this
section see Note, Wire-Tapping and Law Enforcement, 53 HARV. L. RFv. 863 (1940).
" 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Butler, Stone, Holmes and Brandeis, JJ. dissented).
The

defendants moved to suppress evidence obtained by wire-tapping without trespassing
upon defendants' property. Motion was denied in the trial court, 7 F.zd 756 (W.D.
Wash. 1925), aff'd, 19 F.zd 84z (9 th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 557 (1927).
7 U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
S277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
In his dissent, Brandeis, J. said: "When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were
adopted, 'the form that evil had theretofore taken,' had been necessarily simple. Force
and violence were then the only means known to man by which a Government could
directly effect self-incrimination. It could compel the individual to testify---a compulsion effected, if need be, by torture. It could secure possession of his papers and
other articles incident to his private life--a seizure effected, if need be, by breaking and
entry. Protection against such invasion of the 'sanctities of a man's home and the
privacies of life' was provided in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by specific
language. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 [1886]. But 'time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.' Subtler and more farreaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered
in the closet.
"Moreover, 'in the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only
of what has been but of what may be.' The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may
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that evoked greater response, and, in I934, as if in protest to the
Olmstead decision, Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act, 10
Section 6o5 of which provides, in part:
* * .no person, not being authorized by the sender, shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance . . . or meaning of such communication to
any person."
The early application of this section was strict. Its language was
first construed to prohibit the introduction in federal courts of evidence
obtained by wire-tapping.' 2 Subsequently, this ban was extended to
evidence traceable to "leads" obtained by wire-tapping' and to evidence
disclosed by the interception of intrastate messages.' 4 Regarding early
some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related
sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.
'That places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer' was said by
James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these. To Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed 'subversive of all the comforts of society.' Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?" 277 U.S.
438, 473-474 (918).
"0Note, however, that a bill expressly designed to negative the result of tile
Olmstead case failed to pass. H.R. 5416, 7 xst Cong., ist Sess. (1929); see Notes,
z7 MIcH. L. REV. 78 (19z9),

13 MINN. L. REV. 58 (1928)5 see also The Supreme

Court and Unreasonable Searches, 38 YALE L.J. 77 (1978).
1148 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 6o5 (946).
For the thesis that Section
605 was not directed at wire-tapping, however, see z5 MINN. L. REV. 38z (1941) ; 34
ILL. L. REV. 758

(194O).

"In Nardone v. United States, 30z U.S. 379 0937), petitioners were tried and
convicted on several counts of smuggling, possession and concealment, and conspiracy
to smuggle and conceal alcohol. A vital part of the Government's evidence consisted
of testimony by federal officers as to the substance of certain communications of the
defendants which were overheard by tapping telephone wires. The Government contended that Congress did not intend Section 6o5 to prohibit wire-tapping for evidence.
The court, however, ruled that the phrases "no person," and "any person" were inclusive of law enforcement officers as well as private citizens.
15
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 0939) (Nardone 11).' The facts in
Nardone II were substantially the same as those in Nardone I, note zz supra, Section
6o5 was ruled applicable, by implication, to evidence procured through the use of
knowledge gained through tapped telephone conversations. Frankfurter, J. called such
evidence "fruit of the poisonous tree," and the majority ruled out the "fruit" as
firmly as it had ruled out direct wire-tap evidence.
v. United States, 308 U.S. 3z (1939). Here the petitioners were in1'Weiss
dicted for using and conspiring to use the mails for fraudulent purposes. The Government, by means of a wire-tapping and recording device, had made manuscripts of
various incriminating conversations of the defendants. The manuscripts were shown
to one of the defendants, and he thereupon agreed to testify for the prosecution. His
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decisions, it has been said that the Supreme Court construed Section 605
as embodying a Congressional decision to insure the citizen's non-constitutional privacy and, in effect, poured the Fourth Amendment into
the Federal Communications Act.' 5
A countertendency, however, is discernible in more recent decisions.
The bellwether was United States v. Yee Ping Jong6 in which the
mechanical or electrical recordation of a conversation with the consent or
knowledge of one of the parties was held not to "intercept" a communication within the purview of the Act." This trend was temporarily
arrested in United States v. Polakoff,'8 in which Judge Learned Hand,
returning to a more inclusive interpretation of Section 6o5, ruled that
evidence obtained through an extension telephone with the knowledge
or consent of one of the parties to the conversation was inadmissible in
federal court. Judge Hand, in rejecting the Yee Ping Jong rule, concluded that all significance to the Section 6o5 privilege would be denied
by holding that because one party had originated the call he had the
power to surrender the other's privilege. 9 This decision was based, not
upon the Yee Ping Jong concept of "intercept," but rather upon the
premise that the word "sender," as used in the statute, applied to both
parties to a telephone conversation, and that unless both parties consented to the interception, the statutory ban applied.
The Sullivan case, however, in rejecting the respectable precedent
afforded by the Polakoff decision, reverted to the Yee Ping Jong line
of decisions which had since gradually been extended to exclude various
penumbral areas of the wire-tapping controversy from the purview of
Section 6o5. Thus, in Goldman v. United States,"0 the use of a detectatestimony consisted in part of reading the manuscripts. In addition, the manuscripts
themselves were offered in evidence, and they, along with testimony, were admitted by
the trial court. Their admission was upheld by the circuit court of appeals, 103 F.zd
348 (2d Cir. 1939), but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is nothing
in Section 605 limiting its scope to interstate commerce, as the Government had contended.
" See Westin, op. cit. supra note x, at 177.
20 z6 F.Supp. 69 (W.D. Pa. 1939).
"'The interpretation rests upon the definition found in Webster's New International
Dictionary (zd ed. 1948): "To take or seize by the way or before arrival at the
.4ccord, United States v. Lewis, 87 F.Supp. 970 (D.D.C. i95o).
destined place."
However, in United States v. Polakoff, iiz F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir. 194o), note iS
infra, it was held that "The statute . . .speaks of 'interceptions' and anyone intercepts
.
a message to whose intervention as a listener the communicants do not consent. ....
L. REV. 689 (950).
See Note, What Constitutes Wire-Tapping, 45 ILL.
9
1 Id. at 889.
x ,2 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. i94o).
Here the petitioners were indicted for conspiracy to
20 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
violate Section 2 9 (b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. Prior to the trial defendants moved
to suppress evidence which had been obtained by means of a detectaphone placed on a
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phone on the wall of an office in which a member of an alleged conspiracy was engaged in telephone conversations was held not to constitute an interception. And in United States v. Lewis,2 ' the district court
held, as did the court in the Sullivan case, that evidence procured by
means of a monitored telephone conversation was admissible since one
of the parties to the conversation had consented to its divulgence.
Nor does this line of cases represent the only area in which the relaxation of the strictures against wire-tapping has become apparent. In
Swartz v. Texas22 it was held that it is for each state to determine
whether evidence obtained by wire-tapping will be admissible in its own
courts. This decision has been said to reflect the development of a more
rigorous bloc in the Supreme Court tending toward the view that
wire-tapping is 23not repugnant to our "concept of fair play and fundamental rights."
To be sure, the tendency toward de-emphasizing individual liberty
in the name of public welfare lends itself to facile rationalization in
these times.24 But what are its limits? Although the interests of nawall in a room adjoining the petitioners.' The motion was denied, and the evidence
admitted. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision, ruling that "interception" within the meaning of the Federal Communications Act, prohibiting interception
by wire or radio, indicates taking or seizure by the way or before arrival at the destined
place, and does not ordinarily connote obtaining of what is to be sent before, or at
the moment, it comes into the possession of the intended receiver. 316 U.S. 129, 134.
cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. x28 (-954Defendant's motion to exclude evidence ob21 87 F.Supp. 970 (D.D.C. 1950).

(1942)5

tained through recordation of a telephone conversation with the consent of only one
of the parties concerned was denied. The decision was reversed on other grounds, and
the Court's ruling as to the wire-tapping was not challenged. Lewis v. United States,
184 F.zd 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
22 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
In this case state officers set up an induction coil which
enabled an operator to overhear and simultaneously record the conversation between the
petitioner and the consenting party. It was held, (at zoz) : "Where a state has carefully legislated so as not to render inadmissible evidence obtained and sought to be
divulged in violation of the laws of the United States, this Court will not extend
by implication the statute of the United States so as to invalidate the specific language
of the state statute."
2 See note, Criminal Lavv--.4dmissibility in State Courts of Wire-Tap Evidence
Obtained in Violation of the Federal Communications Act, 29 BROOKLYN L. REV. 3141

316 (1953).
"E.g., although President Roosevelt purportedly authorized war-time wire-tapping,
he expressed these sentiments to Representative Eliot: "As an instrument for oppression
of free citizens, I can think of none worse than indiscriminate wire-tapping . . . my
own personal . . . view is close to that of Justice Holmes. . . ... Hearings Before Subcommittee No. r of the Committee on the Jutdiciary on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099,
See generally Emerson and Helfeld, Loyalty Among
77 th Cong., ist Sess. 257 (19421).
Government Employees, 58 YALE L.J. 71 (1948) 5 Note, 2 STAN. L. Rrv. 744, 75o n.
42 0950).
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tional security might well be furthered by a relaxation of the existing
strictures against the use of wire-tapped evidence, 25 it is patent that
patriotic zeal must be tempered with caution where fundamental democratic values may be affected. There are those who maintain that the
trend toward indiscriminate use of wire-tapping has already progressed
beyond safe limits, and their concern has been echoed by Mr. Justice
Douglas who, dissenting in On Lee v. United States,20 confessed:
I now more fully appreciate the vice of the practices spawned by
Olmstead and Goldman. Reflection on them has brought new
insight to me. I now feel that I was wrong in the Goldman
case.

27

Although the dangers and uncertainties of today add some element
of reason to the cause of those who espouse security at all costs, Congress and the courts, while pondering upon a solution to the wiretapping problem, would do well to reflect upon the words of Mr.
Justice Brandeis who, dissenting in the Olmstead case, warned:
Experience should teach us to be on our guard to protect liberty
when the government's purposes are beneficient.... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of
28
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
WILLIAM GRIGG
In 1931, J. Edgar Hoover, chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified
as follows:
Mr. Tinkham: "Is any of your appropriation spent for wire-tapping?"
Mr. Hoover: "No, sir. We have a very definite rule in the bureau that any employee engaging in wire-tapping will be dismissed from the service of the
bureau."
Mr. Tinkham: "I am very much pleased that that is so."
Mr. Hoover: "While it may not be illegal, I think it is unethical, and it is not
permitted under the regulations by the Attorney General."
Hearings Before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departinents, .7xst Cong., 3 d Sess. z6 (1931).
Yet in 194!, Hoover felt that "...
wire tapping should not be permitted except as to
such crimes as I have described, and even then in such a limited group of cases only
under strict supervision of higher authority exercised separately in respect to each specific instance. In the group of cases I have in mind, such as espionage, sabotage, kidnapping, and extortion, wire-tapping is an investigative function of considerable importance." No. r of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099,
7 7 th Cong., 1st Sess. i1z (941).
" For legislative proposals, see Brownell, op. cit.supra note i; Westin, op. cit.
supra note x.
20 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
"id. at 762.
28277 U.S. 438, 479 (198); note 6 supra.

